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ABSTRACT 
Using a unirluc panct data sel on Indinn firms vie ani~Iysc some 
husic hilt imporcant i~nd r)ftcn ncglectctl aspt'cts ot' techr~ology liccnsing 
ngl-cc~nents and their cTlkct un the licenhecs. Thc study shows that the 
sloclc oT scientific and technical krlowlcdge ;~hr.oad has a positive 
i l~ l lucncc on ihc finns' rlccisior) to l ice~ise Sorcipn technolozy indicating 
the cxistcncc of srrtllrg ~echnological spill(~vcl-s. Whilu  he I'il-11) spccilic 
I~CIOI?; like li1.m siir.~, imports, prolit and f'orcign control are found to be 
h ; ~ v i n g  a posilivc intluerlcc on thc tlcuision tcl uolliihor;l~c. roa~.kcr 
ct~riaeniration has a negittiuc effcct. I'hc choice oTpartncrs is influenced 
pusiiiivcl y hy the stock oC patenrs in rhc partncss' coulltry and ncgativcly 
by irs compairars' patcnts. This tend to suggest  ha^, as regards Indinn 
finils. the s~ock of  knr,wlcdgc in onc country is  u substituIc LO thosc 
av3ilnhlu in other countries. E~~irnntcs  oi- r l ~ c  M u l l  inor~ii;tl logit rr~rxlcl 
on \ h e  [crms o f  tcclinnlopy liccnsing ;IS ~n;unilkslod i r ~  lhc ciit'l'cl-cni 
combinarions nC royiilly ratcs :~tirl luirtl)sunl payrueets hsr1c show^^ tha~  
thr: highcat probability i s  ro havc a tcclinolofy dcnl wilh only lumpsum 
p"y!i~cnrs indicaling the tam!: in which 111-1ns oh~:lin technology. This 
could he a co~nhincd cfl'cct of the ha~zainin: powa-ol'lhc Indian firriis 
and thc inorcasin~ c c ~ ~ ~ p c l i t i o n  in the i ~~ tc rn ;~~ iona l  tcchaology mnrkct. 
Our selection-correctccl cstiuialcs of technology pay lnents have shown 
that forcipn contnrl illid exports I~ i ivc a positivc ef'cct an l'oynlly ratcs. 
Prolit is Ibuncl 10 h ; ~ v c  n negativc efl'cct. Siinilarly, while the nlal-kc[ 
shnrc, cxports and imporis Rave a positivc eff'cct on I un ip~um p;tymenls 
foreign conlrol and f i l -n~ 4t.c i s  found 10 havc a r~cyal i \s  cl'fcct. 0111' 
analysis of the cl-icc[ oC forcizn technology liccnsin2 nn protits :11d riel 
cxphrt c;rrnings prcjduced mikcd rrcsulrs. Wl~ilc tcchiiolopy l icc~jsing is  
found to callancc firms' prol ' i~al~i l i ty, it is ;~ssr)cia~erl with a da~npening 
crtcccl on nc.t export e:irnings. 
Introduction 
Them has been an increasing recognition of the catalytic role of 
international lechnology spillovcrs in augmenting productivi~y and 
growth in the Lcss Developed Counlries tLDCs). Such spillovers are 
facilitated prudominan~ly hy roreign technology transfer (in Tndia i r  i s  
called foreign collahorit~ion) from firms in  the Dcvcloped Coun trics 
(DCs) through differen1 modes ranging froin setting up of fully owned 
ruhsidirtl.ies lo ou~righr purcllasc of rcchnology in a r m s - l e n ~ t h  
iransacliclns Notwilhstantling the carlier disenchanrment with forcign 
technology and Transnational corporalions (TNCs)', reccnt research has 
~hnwn that there appcars I ~ I  he rcnl opporlunities for L W s  ro obtain 
high yields to their investments i n  lechnolo~y licensing a,olAccmcnts 
(Basant and Fikkerl 1996). 111 fact, one of ~ h c  new rcscnrch issues in this 
area ~ l a t e s  to thc ' 'incc~~tive ccompelition" arnang LDCs to artract more 
foreign dtrect investment and its implications (UNCTAD 1994, 
Srinivasan 1995). Any research inlo this ai-cil. however, is handicapped 
by the poor thcore~ical base and non svailahilirqr oSreliahle data at a dis- 
aggregated levcl because of [lie slraregic nature of Ihe infbrmaliun 
involved. Hence, Vernun (1990, p 255) notes rhal few of the available 
studies on thc acquisition or tchnology In LDCs have qq-~Ilcd rigorous 
methodology, and thal scaiccly ally has p~nduced incontn)vei~ihle rcsulls. 
Using a unique ciati1 sct on all foreign technology ljccllsing 
agrtcrncnts erltcred into hy lndia's largest 4R5 private sector frm~s. this 
p a p  analyses some hasic hut important and often neglcctctl questions 
on ticcnsing agrcciticnls and rhcir crrect an  rhc liccnwxs. T l ~ c  paper 
Ixt'wntL estin~~ztcs on: a )  the prohahility that a firm involves in rorciprl 
collaboration and the lacrlors thar influcncc rhe decis io~~ lo colIaborate. 
h i  Ihc: pi obubility ot' chot~si ng thcir partners born a particuIar counlry 
and the factors and forces influericing ihc ohscrved choice, c) thc 
pmhal~ilily of ohl;~init~g tcut~t~ology on eel-tain Iel'rns ar~d contiit ion5 and 
the lactors ch:~~ yovci.11 tllc [c!.ms of' liccncing. d )  thu dc~cr r~ l i r~ ;~n~s  ot' [hc 
IL'\JC[S of'roy;~Ity r;i~c ;i[ld l i ~ r r ~ p s u ~ ~ i  pilymenr 10 hc 111;1de for the ~cohnolog 
~r;~iisicr~~crl and c) IIIC cl'fcc~ nC li)l*cign collahol.;~tion on thc liccnrees' 
pctfo~*~nancc in tcrlrls of p~uf i t  ;~r>d i lc l  cxporl c:1rntng2. 
Ciivcn thc L ~ c ~  ~II;IIonly n wlcur ~amplc  was found l o  Ill: ct~g;rgcd 
in fc)l.cign collabo~ uliurl, wc t~sc  the Heckrn;]~~ sclccrion morlel 1 0  co~.rcul 
ror sirlnple sclcctiviiy. Whilc ;I ptob~t moclcl ih u\cd 10 cstirnato ~hc: 
prohahili~y sf' coIl,thoralion. ~ t iu l~ i r~ur l~ ia l  l og i~  ~ncldrls arc cnlploycd to 
d c t c t r ~ ~ i ~ ~ c  ohoicc r ~ l '  the ctlll,lhol-:lling ct,ut~ll.y and thC lct'mr ul' 
coll;ibor.n[ir>n. The: ci'(cc1 of (I.L\~?I cr)lI;~hr)t.aliou on liccnsces' 
pcl.fn~.r~l;inc.c. i\iuni11 y /ctl tlhit~g OLS 
Tllc cstinlatcs iuadc ia ~ h i s  .;uldy s l ~ o w  II;I  lac grow[ t i  ill I~IC s~ock 
ul'scicnril'ic and Icchnical knowlcdgc abroad h;~s n posili\~c infl tlcncc o n  
the firins' Jcuisic~n to liccnse thuign tcchnolr~~y. This tcnd lo suggesl 
Ihc exis~cnce oi'srronp lec11nologic;il \pillovel.';, W l~ i l c  thc firm q~cci f ic 
tuclat.s likc Ihc si1.c. imporls, cxllclrls, p ro f i~  and foreign ctlntrol  ALL' it 
posilivc influcncc. rhc tn:j~.ka concunira!ion scc i~~s  lo havc a ncgativt 
el'iccl on 1l1c C ~ C C ~ S ~ ( H I  (11 coII:lt)o~.;ilc. 'j'tlc CI~O~CC 01'11 parlncl- is ~I~II~ICII~CL~ 
~wsi t ivcl y h p  r l ~ r  s~ock of' Il;rlell1s ill ~llc pi~r~ncl- 's uoilrrll'!; ant1 ncg;rli\!cly 
by its con~pcri~or-'s p;l[c.nlc suggcsli~~g 1Ilat The s~ock of' knowltrlgrl i r ~  
one CO~IIIII-~ ih >I suhsiitutc to those uv;~il;thlr: in v~Rc.rcr,un~rics. Eilirnalcs 
of l11c Mullinomi:~T I o y i ~  n j r d c l  on 111c ~cr-ms o f  Intcign ~ol l ;~hor~; i~iur~$ ;I:, 
IIIL~II~ t '~*iii:~l I 11 t11c ~III'I~I-PI~I L T~IJ I I~ ; I I~~) I IS 01- I,O)~:III~ WIGS LIIIL~ I LIIII~S~IIII 
h;~> hhtrivli !~:II ~ I l c  hi ~hc51  ~l~'c>ll i$l~il t!. is 1 0  I i i~vc ;I tcct~noloyy tk ;~ l  with 
only I ~ I I I I ~ I " I I I ~ P ; I ~ I \ ~ I I I : '  ir\dic;~~irlg I t ~ c  Icr-~n\ i l l  w hizll I'i1-11ls ol,l;~iii 
ICCI~I~~II~I;~. This ct>t~ltl hc it r i ) r ~ ~ b i ~ ~ c ( l  cll?r.~ 01- lilt ~I~F:I~IIIIIF ~ O ~ Y C I -  cil' 
Il-tr I l~rl i i tn I'ii-l~~:, a~ l t l  111c inc>l,c:thil~p c t ~ ~ u p c r i l i o ~ ~  i l l  lllc in lur .~~;~ l~on:~I  
ICCIIIIOIO~~ ~I~:II-~cI. 0 ~ 1 r  s c l ~ ~ t i i ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ o ~ - ~ - c c ~ ~ ~ l  c$Ii111;1t s o f  I-O?;III~ I.;I~C~ 
;111tl ~ ~ 1 1 1 1 ~ ~ ~ 1 1 1 1 ~  p i i ~ I l l r l I 1 ~  \llo\x! I ll;l! fOi'~ig11 ~ ~ > ! l t 1 ' ~ ~ ~  : l l d  C.kl703-lS !l:l\-C i t  
~ O S I I I V ~  ~~l ' l 'ccl 0 1 1  I - { > ~ ; I I I ~  I,:LLCS. PI.II~'~I i x  !'OII[I(I 10 II~I~C ;i ~ icy ; j~ i v~% cl-fcci. 
2 \V<* l l t r  r r r l l  1111~11~1 11, ~ICK'I I~ 1111. (lr.l;~i!\ CII ~ ~ I I I I L - ~  ~I.III:C~ II-;!;H,~IIII~ ~LYII !~~?I{>~~ IICCIISIII? 
111 I!IC lk~cl~:~~) ~ I > ~ L I ? I J , ~  \I,IIILII 1 ~ 1 ,  IT~I.) ~III?~LYIC~I [o <~~t)sr;b~~~i;bl C I; I I I~  111 I lw i r c i : ~ ~ ~  
y~.;Ll,\ l t l ~ ~ ~ ! ~ \ t ~ ~ ~ l  l ~ i l ~ l h  :11< 1vKc1 l<,,l I t?  ;I l~rccl>t  < [ L l ~ l ) ,  1)s s~ t t~ l -~~ l l l ~k l~ l : I ~ l  C I  :I[ I k~+ h> 
Similarly while the inarket sharc, exports and irnponc have a posi~ive 
effect om lumpsunl payments. roreign conrrol and firm sizc is found to 
have a neg;ltive cffccr. Our analysis or the effect of' forei~n technology 
liccnsing using the eslinlatcs d t h c  profil and expurl funclions produced 
mixcd rcsults. While technology liccnsing is fcjuntl lo enhance firms' 
profitability, i t  is  found to he xsociated with a dnmpcning cfCect on nut 
export exningc. 
This papcr is  presented in five sections includin~ thiq inrroduclion. 
In  he next section we describe the different data sets used and p~nccdurc 
involvcd in the measurcrncnt of vnrinhlcs. The third section presents tile 
specific issues and fhc econornetric models itscd in thcir analysis. Results 
of thc uslllnales dTI: p1~cbc111cd and riiscussed in section tour. Some 
concluding clhserva~ ions are made in the last slytion. 
Data Sources and Measurement of Variables 
This study i s  hlscd on rhc daw on all l i w e i ~ n  coll;~bor;lliorl appro~:als 
ohlair~ed hy tllc 485 131-gest firms ill thc Indian inrfust~-ial seclnr for the 
year 19X'i. IW8, 198'3, 1990, and 199 1 .  To hegin with, wc havc collected 
the tinancia] stlrlistics rillvestment, srclcs cxport. import, p ro f i~  clc) of 
thc larycsr 500  privakc corporarc firms Crom t l ie publication - Kcy 
Financia! D;ui~ o n  l x g e r  Business Ur i i t s  - by the Cenler I'or Monitoring 
[he Indian Ecmomy. We confined our analysis to a sample of  485 private 
ccctor firl-ns. In  ndilitiori t{) financirtl statistics, the publication also 
provides data on thc produclion and inst;~lled cnpacit!, o f  dii'f'crcnt 
producl(s) and thc ownaxhip of  thc tirm. I t  need to he slaled at thc outsct 
~ h n t  n~os t  r)f h e  I'irms wcte multi-product I'innh which made our analysis 
mol.c dit'ficult. FOI- inust pru-t ot' study. we focus on ~ h c  ~najor p~.clduct 
deli net! as thc product whicll accounts tbi. the la~~gcst proportion of rhe 
hales by tllc I'iml. Goins hy their major producl it was founrl !ha1 tl~esc 
firm3 prtiducc 1 19 pl-oducrs. These data me ;~vitilahlc ~ O I -  t l ~ c  Civc ycar 
period liunt 1989 10 1993- Though Ihe dara rrlcrs to !he lal-gest filmis. 
there i s  huhstnntial variation in the data En tcrmq of any commonly used 
rocasurus of sizc l ikc satcs or inveslmer~l. A sulnmary of the vul-iables 
uscd i n  t l r  nr~alvsis is PI-ovideil in t;lhle 1. 

The micro paten1 dala covers chc period 1975 to 1994, groupcd into l'ivc 
time pcriods viz. 1975-78 (four years) 1979-82 (li)ur yeala) 1983-86 
(four yc;~rs) 1 987-89 (thrcc years) 1 990-92 (thrce years) and 1 993-94 
(IWO years). 
The collnho~rtion dummy in the prohit model is arrived a1 in the 
followinp way. Wc havc scilnncd tbrough all the f'orcign collabnr:~tion 
approvals tbrlhc five ycars(IY85,198X, 1989, 1990and 1991) I'orwhich 
inCormntion i\ avuilnhlc. The duminy takes thc uaiue 1 if (he I'irm has 
had collt~hora~iun i any ol' lbcsc yearb and zcro ir riot. Indced, thcrc is 
room Ibr some concern bccnuhc we do not havt  the data Ihr thc ycars 
1986 ant1 1987. However, d close exurnin;ltion ol'the dalu reveals chat 
~ h c  iulditional ini'ormation I'or thc missing two ycars would havc addcd 
only  a i'cw ~ i c w  firms. 
I n  this rtudy, thc si/c of thc fin11 is incasiu-cd in Lcrnls of thc gross 
fixed assct :I! constant (I9XO==lOO) prices. the dcilutor uscd being thc 
wholc snlc pricc index of ninchinery and mnchinc tools. Exports and 
i~npc~res art: eb~i~nalcd i n  rlollai' terms to take c:trc of the possible ei'fcct 
on account ot'rupcc dcv:llua~ion. Psolit,lhil~ly ic rrlcasured i n  tcrnls of 
!hc rillio ol'ller profii ( i i l ' l ~ r  h x )  to nct sillcs. Thc dummy variublc, f'orcign 
contn)l. indicnles whcthcr a firm is rol-cign cuntrollcd or not. 11 takcs !hc 
vduc of o11c if thc ful.c~gtl cquity 15 marc thiui 51 pcr ccnt and  xcro 
olherwirc 
'T11cl.c arc d iffel-ei~t ways O C  csli~rlaiing thc cxlcnc of spi llovcrs and 
most selldies cinplay c i~hcr  che RSrD or the paicnls ns lhc proxy Ibr rhe 
aggrcgatc stock ni scicntilic atld ~echnicnl knowledge'. In thc prcscnl 
sLudy wc n~akc use of thc data o n  patcnls rcgistcretl i n  USA by holh US 
nnci 1brcig11 lirms. I'hc cstimalion proccrlurc of the lotal pntc~ll which 
rclwscnl t l ~ c  spillover i s  AS lilllows. To hcpin wilh, we have collcclcd 
Ihc totill nuinhcr of  piilcn~s rcgistci.cd by India's major collaboi*a~ing 
crrt~n~rics like, IJnited Stntcs, En~liind. Gern\any, and Japan in Ihc 1 19 
1ni1jo1. ~~roduc t  of I~ id iun  I'irms in USA during 1975- 1986. The P ~ ~ C I I I S  or
nthcr uoiinlrics is cstiitiatatl ns a rcsi(l~utl. Thcn wu huvc matlc a s~ock of  
parents by tach country i r l  l l ic 1 19 proil i ic~s  ti^ thc peric~d 1975- 19SO. 11 
nccd Lo hc nuled \lia\ thc ~rlicro potcnt data i s  w r y  I I I U C ~ I  U S  r.cn\c~.cd in 
Ihc scnsc Ihal whilc il co\.c~.s ;11l lIlc pnlcn[s hy ;III thc US rirnis, thcrc is 
nu urldcr csii tilalion of I tic p;rccrlIs 1,): oihcl- coitnlrics. rrlbait wi111 a clcclinc 
i11 rhc cxlent o l u n d c r  csli~nnrion ovcrliine. For exrirnple. c.;limalcs hnsed 
on Ihc clala I'I-on1 Basic Science and Technology Statistics piiblisliccl by 
thc OECLI shuws that clu~.itlg 15375-78 O L I ~  of  ~ h c  tola1 Gcrnl:~r~ p;ltcnls 
(ic. lot;~l numhur of j~;~tcn!s rcpisicrcd hy r l k t  Gcnnans ill Gcr~b~any) 
unly 1.4 pa- ccnl wcrc ~.cpistct.ctl in  the USA iund ~ h i h  incrcascd l o  19.8 
pcr ccnl tli11,irtg 1982-XO. Sin~ilur LrcnJ was uhsc~,vcd in the c;wu of'olhcr 
c t~ i~nu ics  wcIE. \Vc, (1icr.c lorc, collcctctl thu ~ o t r ~ l  nlumhcr o f  patenis 
I-cgis1crc.d in oilch 0 1 '  111e countries duritlf rhc pul-ic~d of' ;r~lalysis. 'The 
cstirna(cd ratio o f  Illc 11ulliber ol' Ixklcnts rcgih~crcd by c;icIi 01' thcse 
cclun trks in tllc llS 10 111ci1 tc~tal  ~ i i ~ ~ t i h c ~ .  01' l l l c ~ ~ t s  was uscd lo :tcljuat 
Ibr pnq~c~ is i t y  lo petcni ahmad. 
I t  neud tn hc notctl Illat nol all the ~ ~ ; ~ t o r l ( s  11ladc by thcsc c o u n ~ r i e ~  
arc ol'rclcvanoc ( ( I  Indi:~. Hcr~cc wc nccd to uslir~late ~ l i c  torill numhcrof 
p:tlcnl.; lulcv;~nl l o  Irirli;~. This i s  oh1:tincJ hy w c i s h i n   tic tutr~l nu i i~hc~-  
0 1 '  p;llcnts with rclcv:~ncu i~ ldcx'  rliic 1 0  Evcrlson Kr I'l~lnarn ( I O X O )  and 
l3;1%1!1r L% Fikkcrl ( 1990)). Sincc 1l1c rclcv;rncc indcx wn5 ;~v;iiIilhlc only 
at i t  II\OI.C i l ~ g ~ t p l l ~ 1 1  ICVCI (45 ~~(IIIUCI g1.011pu) wc COII;~IISC~ our I I 9  
P~)~I~IL-IX 10 45 li~ cs(i11l:lli I I ~  lllc rC1cv:~ti~ pittciii. 
'J'IIL'TC ;II-~ Iwo ~ ; i ~ ' i i \ t > l ~ ~  L ISC~ ill tllc c ~ l i ~ ~ l i t l c d  cclualion\ lo rc]li'c$cr~t 
lhc spiIluvcr. Thc. firs1 \'iu.i:thle - Own Kclcviuil t 'a~unl - 1;tkcs tht vn lu t  
of toeill ~-clc.vant p:hlc~ii (11' 111c ICCIIII~)IO~?: exporting cot1ritl.y. Ano~lit'r 
cstinia~cd \.ariilhle - Orhcrs liclcviln! Parcnr - e\scnti:illy c;lprur.cs \he 
influcr~cc ol' piitcnts hy o l l l c ~  counl~~ics o n  Ihc dcci~ior l  o coll;~t,or;~te 
:~ntl/or thc L'IICIICC {)I' p:t~'t~lcrs. For C'S;IIPICI. ii' (tic ~cchnoIopy c x l ~ o r ~ i n ~  
i O l l l l l ~ ~  is thl: IJS il   ilk^^ 1 1 1 ~  ;l\CTil?C 11tl111l1~l' t~1'p;llClltS hy Cotllllri~h 
- 
' I 'hch I<clc~:lncr! I i ir lcx ( IlLL I ik I l l ~  : ~ [ i t )  rvl  IIIC 11u1utrc.r vl' 1mtcru.r $1:1nlc~l I,? l11~l1.1 to 
IIIVCIIILII-\, in  )nd11\11-y I iio[lt ~.CILIII~I: c to I~IC I I L I I I I ~ K L I O I ' I ) : ~ ~ C [ I I ~ ~ I : I ~ I C ~ ~  h) II I I I I~  c 117 
other than US. Sin~ilarly for all thc countries. 
Tn terns of the period or analysis our l'mus is on 1989, 2990 and 
191) 1. for ai l  the above mcntiotled data are simultoncously available only 
for these lhrec ycars. In terms of thc policy stance o f  the govcrnrnenr 
towards foreign rcchnology licensing, above period may be considerod 
as more lihcral ujmpared to the seventies and lcss liberal as con~pared to 
the ncw oconomic policia announccd sincc the rniddlc or 199 1 .  Indecd, 
six rnonlhs in the second haif of 198 1 represented a liheralizcd policy 
cnv i~~nn icn~ .  
Methods: Hypotheses 
We hcgin with the cotlahoration dccisian. Givcn that cmly 47 pcr 
ccnt of the f i rms in thc sample htd any forcign callstboration, (during 
t 985- I99 1) [he d c p n d e n ~  variable is binary. Hence wc approached thc 
problem using a pmhit morid. Wc hypothesim thal Ihc dccision lo 
collaborate is goi~lcr.ncd, ititercrlia, hy cxagcnous rac~ors such as the 
available stock of scientii'ic and technical know ledge abroad, f r n ~  specific 
factors like market prwer, si.zc. ownership and profir and induslry specific 
I'x~ors measuring rhc compctit ivc cnvirtwlmcnt in which [he firms opernrc 
and other indusrry spccil'icities. 
Tlrc dcpendcnl variable in lhc modcl iakcs the value ol'one if thc 
firms had any forcign coilahoraf inn sincc 1985 and zcrr) ol herw isc. There 
ure Ihrce scts of indcpendcnl v;isiahlcs. The tirst a t ,  Own Relevant. 
Patents and Others' Relevant Patents, capturcs the intluence of the 
stock of scient ilic and lcchnolagicil knowtcdgc ahmad ~neasured by ~ h c  
cun~ulalivc stock ol' rclcvanl patents regislanett by thc m io r  rcchnology 
cxponing countries during 1975-86". Wllilc this variahlc lrleasurcs the 
6 This, in a wnw. rcpwwn~i rhr poaniial xi~pply nFscienlific I;m>wlt.dg. The knnalcxlgc 
slock ~ K ' I U ~ I I ~  i1vnila1>Je  nay he 1~s': bccau<enFrcz~(~n~ hticiuding IIW Culluwirig: w l i r  
of Ik lwl~nolugin 111;1)' 1104 be <olrl tu tle LIKs on acLmulit of rcitwl~s incJudl~g 
qtratcgic uric< It i\ ;~luo pc7csihlc lhat st)tne u l  rlw paretits tn:ty nor acrually mnlr ill 
viahlc tcch~~ologic.; or cotuu u l  the vinhlc icokiulogies arc ;~c.~u:~Lly patcntcrl at A. 
While wc vccngiizr ~ucl i  npap t 1 1 ~  ihvaibhlc d:rta #nay no! allow us to r~kc  inro:~rcounr 
!his a q w ~ i .  
s t c ~ k  or own inventions, Others' Rclewant Padcnts rneasurcs the stock 
or i~~vcntions by courtfries other I han 1hc collaborating country The 
former is cxpccted to have a positivc influence on thc decjsion ru 
collabr~nle and the lntrer is expectcd to be a major choice variahle i n  the 
selccrion of partners. The s w n d  set of vzlriahles inciudcs a) market 
share b) profit. c) exports. d) imports, e) size and c) ownership (foreign 
or local) measure% finns" uharucfcristics. The third scr OF variables, 
market structure md the industry dummies are ia~ended to capture 
the compcdtivc envimnrr~ent in which tllc tinnsclpenic a d  uthw indusw 
speci l'iciiies. 
The first Finn-slmi tic I'aclclr, the tnarkct power of the collaborating 
l'irm, as represcntd by i ls  nli~rkct share, in gcneral, is poslulatal tn have 
a negative influcncc on the decision 'lo collahonre. Assuming thlzt the 
primary objective of t l ~ :  firm is to rnaximizc profir, a price seuing firm 
(n~anopc~lisl), ovraling in a closcd economy has hardly any incentive to 
go ror rorcign cullah~';l~ion. On thc olhcr hand. i C  rhe lirm i s  a price 
taker, il may resort tn foreign collabordtion either to bring down thc cost 
of produclian or to lind new cxpo~-1 markct or hurh. Viewed thus, it could 
hc argued that lkrc i s  an inversc relation between t t~c nlmket sharc anif 
the decision to colrahorate. 
Anothcr film specific factor Ihar is expcctcd to influence the 
tlecision collahorale is thc qizc or the l i r ~ ~ l .  Wc e x p r  a pflsilive scalc 
eWccl ror [he following msons; Finr. similnr lo the resource cost of 
technology Tr'r;~nsrer incurretl by the tcchnology exporting firn~s (Tcecc 
1977). thcrc is substantial search cosl rrr he incurred i y  the technology 
i ~ n p r ~ i n g  Firms which rhc larger oncs would he Inore readily willing lo 
undcrlakc. Scuondly the tcchnology exporting firms arc t i  kcly lo prcrer 
I n w r  firms bwause oS Ilwir higher risk raking c i~pab i l i ~y  and hishcr 
expcctcd relurrl by way ol' myalry and lumpsu~n payments. Viewed i n  n 
si~nilar vein, we e x p l  a psitive rclation ship between tlw liml's prolil 
and the dccision to collahora~c. 
Whilc fhc role ol' technology in tndc has attncld ansidenMe 
atlention hy rescarchers, rhe pmsihle "rcvcrsc c;~usalion" rcrnains almost 

The estimated prohit equation is 
Prob (Collaborate = a,, + a, ow11 ReIevatlt Patent 
+ or, sizc a, ~nnrkel shares 
+ or, inarket conccntra~ion + n, prvfil+ a, Foreign Control 
a, export + a, import + a, d chemical 
+ a,,, delectrunics + a,, d engineering + a,? d steel & hasic 
t- a,, d textiles + a,,  d othcrs 
where 
c.P 
Prob (collaborale) = 
I +eXP 
Having taken thc decision ta collaborate, thc next issue that a l i ~ m  
faccs is to dccidc on which country to collah~.ate w i h ?  Our objecrive 
is to estitnare the prohahilily that a collaboration is  agreed upon wilh 
USA, England. Germany, Japan, or  Other countries. Also, we 
are concerned with identitjing the facrors having a bcnring on thc 
choice made. These issues have been analyzed using a multinomial togit 
model. 
In thc tnuttinomial lopit rtiode17 wc estirnalc a sct ol'cocflficienu 
say D[". IY?', and l3"' corresponding 10 each outcome category such [hat 
The modt.1, however, i s  unidentified in the sense thal thcr-e is morc 
than one solution to B", IY", and a'" lhat leads to (he same prohrtbilitics 
for y=I ,  y=2 and y=3. To identify thc model. one of R'I ' ,  a(?', or R"' is 
arbitrarily set to zero. If we sel 8'1'=0 then the remaining coet'ficients H'" 
and fit'' would ineas ure the change relalive to y= I group. Setting IY"'=0, 
the equations Ibr estima~ing  he pi-obnhilitics become 
7 See Grcenc (1993). For all intuitive i~~troductiun to the topic see Ken~lrdy (1997) 
The selccted comp;lrisnn group is the fifth category (Other countries). 
The tirst hypothesis k i n g  tcsted is thal the choice of a country 
dcpends on i ts  stock of scienti fic and technical knowlcdge vis-a-vis thal 
or the cornpct ing countries. Thc other indcpcndcnt variables in he madel 
arc thc same as those iel the probi t model. 
The ncxt qucstion deals with the terms of cnllahoraiions, marc 
s ~ c i  tically the choicc of the diffel-cnl nlodes at' payment for technology. 
Sludies have shown thal  the mol-ket I'or tcchnolag liccnscs. like othcr 
markcis for inrangihlc knowledge, is susceptible rs n~arkct in~p-fectbns 
(Caves ct.al 19x3, Vernon 1990) arising liom anall nunhers bargaining, 
appropriahiliry pmhlcms, unccrtainty. tmnwc~ion cosl. and so on. These 
markct failulhes ionply s c v c ~ l  se$ or prediclions z l k ~ ~ t  the prcvalcnce 
and provisions of techmlogy transactions, wmc 01' which have hcen 
lesred by Caves el at (1983). Our rocus hcre will hc on rhc terms as 
rcfleclcd in the payrncnts involvcdK. Piymcrif.; for rcchnnlogy are 
gcncrally n~ade in rcrlns mpally (a cerli~itt pcr ccnt of rhe sales)' and/ 
or lumpsum ImytHetlt which is gcncrall y paid at (he tinlc of collaboration 
or in installments. As has hecn argued in thc litcnture, under competitive 
condilions. while royalty paynlcnts may advcrscly affect prolirahili~y 
8 Thcn: an. u t k r  tzrrllq incolvtxl ill [lie cc~llnhnmrion agmnlrlbis like ~$tiictions 411-1 
e~pol t .  crush Isc-ensillg of  tucl~~rolqy,  i~ i ipo~i  nl' capital good\ iuld ~ V J I C S  311 co on. 
Huwever. uith rhc nvaihhlc d,~t;a wc ale no1 able ru look into ! h ~ w  a~pccls. 
9 In tht: caw (IT twhnical culk~hnriol~s r k  nmi1au111 ny;llly rate payable if 5 prr ccnl 
of  rk ~alcc and rhc ceiling for ihc uvc~al l  paynlcnl (la~npsurl~ + royaliy) is 8 prr ctnl 
of ik v:~luc uf p~cxluct~on during the coll~lmnnion prid. l e s ~  lal~dartl deductions. 
Higllci royail) mlc up to B pcrculhl is :rllc~wcd fu~*rxpoirc. A% WI t l ~ '  O\ crdl guiti~!illcs 
of rhc govemilleni. ill ovcnll lcch11oluy.y pyincnrs. more wrigll;~gc iis to hc given In 
ruyallg mrhcr illall luaa~psumit p;ryllwnls. 
(hccau.sc i l  raihcs thc voriohIc cost, and lllcrci'ot'e the 1nar2111aI cost) thc 
lumpwu'il payments wily not have an cl'rccl on pl.or'il hccauac i l  i~i'l'cc~s 
only I'ixcd cost (Kntrak 1988). What weest im:~tc i5 the prubahility Ih;~r a 
t'orcign collaboration involvcs a) only royally, h) only lumpsum c) hutb 
royalty ant i  lumpsul~i  uid d )  ncilhcr royally nor Iiuup\urn using a 
multinomial lugit inode\. 
In  the mudel !ha1 we c \ l ima~c ,  only lumpsum cnlcgory i c  
thc coltiparison group. Wc I~yporhe\irc thal thcrc ale dilTcrenccc in [he 
lcrrns ol'coll~borations ol fbcd by diflercnt countries. Fur this purpose 
wc have inuorpora~cd ut)ilnlry dummics In thc 'slimatod rnul~ino~i i iu l  
moitcl. Thc othcr indcpcridcnt variablch oonaidcred i n  the mudcl :~r*c thc 
ones includcd in thu pn>hit niodcl. wirh thc cxccption of lot,lI rc1cv;uit 
palen1 . 
The next issue rela~c.; to  he frlc~ors ~ h a l  ~ I C ~ C I  minc ~ h c  ;u'rnouni o f  
lu~npsum and royalty rulc. We have es~imatal  sepal-ate 01,s etlufittcl~u's 
t'or thc royalty rate and the lulnpsum paynicn(5 using d:11a I'rom  how 
coll;thol-nring firins. 
The estima~ed equalions are 
Royally = P,, + PI co l l~ l i i r r~  + 13, ~ i~n i ' kc~shn l .~  P; cxpo1.t + 
fi, i~nprbl-l t P, si/.c + 13, u\ncdurn + 13: d c l ~ ~ ~ n i ~ i l l  t Ph C I C I C C ~ I . ~ ~ ~ C S  + 
B,, d cnginccring + PI,, d stecl + p,, J I'oocl+ p,, d olhcrs 
However. thc iibovc plncetliue is  ;~fl'cclccl hy s~umple at.lculion hiaa 
(illst> culled Heuknlan sclcc~ion bias). This hi;& 31-isc oul uf Ihc hlcl 1hn1 
Ti r~ i~s  dccidc whzthcr 10 ct,llahori~le or  not arid wc scleut otily lhose 
col1;ihor;lting lil-111s and observe only their roy;~lry rales ant1 I~r~npsuln 
pllyrilcnts. I f  firms madc tlicsc decisions ranilomly, we could havc ignol.ud 
t h : ~ ~  ;(I1 royally ratcs and Iunipaurn paymcnts arc ohscrvcd and ;in OLS 
eslininfion ~ncthiwl cnuld havc hccn used. Thc nssu~npt ior~ oisuch rantlorn 
collahora~ion behavior is unlikcly to he lruc; tirms which conli.onted 
with higher lumpsum i ind royalty rates anay have chosen not to 
collahorutc. To put i t  differently, thc tirrrls did not cnllnborate hccilusc 
thcir rclscrvnrion price - I ~ I C  ~naxin~um pricc which thcy wcrc ready ro 
pay in terrnsol'n~yalty and lumpsum - werc lower than denlanded hy thc 
foreign fir111.""'Uiirlcr struh condi~ions thc ohscrvcd royalty and lumpsum 
are biascd ihnd i~ is possihlc  hat ~hc  linns who chosc aot lo c o l l a h r i ~ t ~  
could havc cven lowcr olTcr of royally and lumpqum h u ~  (heir ceiling 
would havc hccn FI~II lowcr. Heck~nim sclectinn model (Heckrnan 1'179) 
provides the r~ier hrdolosy for thc mnsis~cnt and asy mpror icnlly eficicnt 
esrirnnte of rhc myitlty nmd lumpsum by ccrrrccr ing for snnlplc sclcclivi~y. 
Thc hcckman sclcc!ion model nssuiacs [hat s pn~c~l!ial ohservaiion is  
ohseri~erl if' 
wllcre u, li;w a standard llormal distri hu~ im.  Simulla~ieoudy rhcrc i s  
anolhcr rcsrcssion erluntion 
whcre u, also hns :I s~andartl nounill distrihurion bur u, is polcntially 
correlarcd wiih u, with cc~rrclat ion r. When r # 0 st;lndartl regression 
~cchniqurs applicd IO the sccand equutiun yield hinscd rcsults. The 
heckman rclcction model thcre Tore involvcs Ihc cslimation or lwo 
quih~ions ant1 il uscs the Mills ratio eaii i~i~[cs (Hcckmnn 1979) Ibr starling 
vnlues. 
I n  cs~it l in~inp ~ h c  Hcckman ~r~odc l  wc nccd to  loc;~tc certain 
identifying variiihlcs; thc variables that strungly affccl thc decision ro 
coltahorate hut not thc rcrms of corlahorarion. The ~ w o  identifying 
variahlcs in the cniai i~~ed 1i1mIe1 arc t l ~ c  111i11'kcI concc~~lri~rion (4-tin11 
10 It cnuM nl~n  Ixr posqiblr th31 ilir govrnisirnial ;lppwv:~l was ~io! zit-el~ becaufc uiftiu 
I~iglwr ~'uy:hlly and lunipru~rt payjllclll iavolvetl in  ior:~ii!. ol2icr Iraron\ 11kc I!E Ilnlrllv 
uCtcch~~ulqy invdvtd. Wc aqz~~riw for ~lia! rhe mllnbrr131iuii H-a( nM a g n ~ t l l ~ p  k c a l ~ w  
of hirhtr pylhKnl. 
conucnlrntion ralio) In the product concerned and thc 10t;ll numl-rcr of 
rclevnnt patcnls in  Ihe collahoratiny ctlunfries. I t  is hypothesized that a 
frrnr which t)pcrittes i n  a h iyhly uompcti l ivc n ia rkc~  has a highcr 
prohohility 11) coll;thordte whilc i t  clocsn't inllucncc dircu~iy  he tctms ol' 
cnntrnct. Sizililarly. whilc an incrcnsc in tlic %lock o i ' p i ~ ~ c n ~ s  incrcascs 
lhc prohuhilily ot' collaborating i t  may not dirucrly intlucncc thc tcnns 
ol'collahoration. 
Thc lasl issuc rc la~cs 10 ~ h c  et'tkct 01' h ~ r c i ~ n  coltnhoi.ntion (111 
~>cri'or.lni~ncc. 11, hits hccn argucd thal suhslnriti:il gains itrc 10 hc madc hy 
llie I..DC l i r ~ t i ~  Ily increascd lcvcls o f  technology I iccnsing (Rnsnn~ nnll 
1:iliken I1)06) IIuncc, il i s  Icpilirr~atc to ~a i sc  n qucs~ion rcgurd i~~y tlic 
cl'l'ccl ol' ~cchricllt)gy licensing on thc ilnporling I'irn~s. I n  i l l is sludy wc 
sclcclud two i ndici~loi-5 o f  pcrl'o~.mancc, prc~fi [s ;ln(I ncl  oxport c;u-nings. 
Tllc huric liypclrhusix is tli;it ~ h c  forcign ~o1l;ihor;ition 2nd ~ l i c  inflow 
<)I' t'orcipn lcul inology un i~h lcs  11ic f i rms IO hr.ing down c o s ~  r j t '  
~~r'oduclicln a d i~icrcnsc i111c1-11~11ionnl co~ilpclil ivcncss ;]lid profi~ahility. 
11) thc iriiliirl ctlu;~tic~ris ll lal wc l lavr e ~ t i t l l i l l ~ ~ l .  I 'ollowir~g IIC c'ommo~i 
l v ~ c ~ i c c .  clll;~hor;ltin: i i rn is ilrc d i s i i n ~ t ~ i s l i c d  l r o ~ n  orllcts t ~ y  ;I
t lut i~niy v ;~~~ i i~ t l l c~ .  Wc lcs!ctE l i w  xipni licant rli l'l'crcnurs in cocll-icicrlts 
I)CIWCCIII ~ i ) l l i ~ h ~ ~ ~ ~ i i l ( ~ ~ ~  anrl IIOTI c o l l ; h o r u ~ o t ~ .  FLi~ving i)hscrvctl a 
s l ; i~ is l i c~~ l ly  sigliil'icnnt dil'fvrcnuc in ;ill tlic v;~~.i:iblcs. iiiclurling IC 
cndu~cnous.wc t i i~vc cali~ti;ttcrl selwrull: 01-S I'or cullnhora~ors ;uicl no11 
L X I I  l~l l~ori l lors. 
Estimation Results 
Wc begin wilh rcsulls of the pmhil model (scc table 3)- Wc find 
srrnng cvidctlcc Ibr in~erna~ionnl technology spillovers in zl~e Indian 
industrial sector. That is. Inrlian firms rcspond posirively 10 thc 
advanccmcnt~ i n  111c scienlilic knowtedgc ahroad by developing 
collahora~ions. This is cvidenr rrora ftie posilivc and stlrlislically 
sipniticitnl value ol' thc cstirnaled ctxficicnt reprcscnting the stock ol' 
tow1 rclcvanl pnEcn(s in the major collahr~mlin~ counztics. We also lind 
I hat thc t~iarkct concenlrrrlion has a ne9:hrivc cll'ccl on lhc dccision lo 
callahorMc. This tend lo suggcsr that thc finr~s opcra~ing Ihc cumpeliliv~ 
m;aket considw lbrcipn coll;~horation ;a onc ofrhc slriltcgics to increaw 
lhcir cortlpctit ivctlcss. I t  is possi hIe illat rorcign cotlaboration enahlcs 
Ihcrn to bri~ly down thc cost of production and provide other (~ecunial.y 
henefi~.; li kc thc use of lijrcign hrand ilalncs which hclp increasing rhc 
avcept:bhiliry ol- their' prtducl". Thc ctwfiuicnts ol' the prolit and sizu 
viiriahlcs arc h~arisr icall y signi licant ant! pc~si I vc. La1 ger firms and ~IIOSC 
with highcr prn171 not only havc rhc rcsourccs lo invesl in rhc search 
process and lo r;~kl: the risk, hut thc t'ireign limts also sccrn lo have 
grealcr prcfcrcncc for O~ose with 1a1.gcr rebnuivc (>axe. Colitinp lo thc 
inlluencc of ~radr  on technology itnpoil i t  is h u n d  lhar i~np)l-I and exprt  
ol' goods has uataly~ic eFI'cci or ~cchnology licc~lsing. Thc du~nmy 
variahlc nrprcsen~inz the Ib rc iy  cquity pirrticipation is ;dsu positive and 
signiiicanL suggcsr ing [ha1 thc suhridizu.ics of lbrcign I~I.IIIS art ~ I O I ' C  
likely to uol lahorutc than loc;~l irn~s. 
Nto iiow turn la the rcrr~lth of inraq-indusrry viu-i;trion ns rcllecrctl 
fmin t l~c  t i c f f c i e ~ ~ i s  o1'induhtry durn~nics. The ct~f l icient al'the nnlittcd 
indiis~ry (~extilcs) i. rouad ncyativc ;ind significant. Il is worlh noting 
Ilia! thc hchavior of fond. .;~ccl and rl~isccllancot~s indus~rics are uot 
qigniTic;rntly clcl'Felwlt rrom tcx~iles. Orhcr indus~~ies like clcctmnics. 
clic~nioal and engineering industries hhow n signilican~ly difl'crcnl piiltcrn 
as coinpnrcd to text ilcs. 
The rcvults ol'lhc cstim;l!ed mul~inonii;il lugi l  model (scc t:ible 3) 
indicorc Ihc k l n r s  influcnciti_r the chclicc ol'col~nrry by Ihc fir-ms. Thc 
nlcdcl crtahles us lo cs i i~ i l a~o  h c  prohnhil i ly rhai a c ~ l l a h o r ~ ~ r i o ~ i  is agrccd 
up on with US, Englanrl. Gcrrna~iy. Japan cir (11hcr counrt-ics. Estirr~atcs 
ol' ~ ~ n h i t h i l i ~ y  o f  having ii ctl l labori i~io~i will1 cach of' thc co~untrics h;~\:c 
shown 11iot r he highcst probability is rill- Ihc Orhcr Uoun11. i~~ (h0.33) 
i'ol lowed hy Gcritiany 1 1 7.40). Japirn (9.57) USA (6.97) and UK (5.72). 
Tl lu val-i;lhle rcpl-cscn~ing thc own total ~.elcvanl p;ilcnrs is  posit iuc ;rnd 
sig~iificnnt with rcvpcct to thc choicc re~;ir i l ing all Lhc cor~r~tr.ics. Thc 
vi~r*iohIe I-cpl-esen~ing ~ l i c  relev;lnl patents ol'ollicr countl-ics. on rhc othct. 
h i l n d ,  sl?owc, a s~a~is l ical l  y significant negali vc sign. This ilnpl ius t hi11 
~ h c  overall stock o f  ccicntir'ic knowletlge rclevani 10 India l11;1t cx is~s in 
any otic country is  InoFc or lcss similar to thosc in orhzrs and llcrjcc ihcy 
arc suhstitulcs. This ~ u c u ~ i s  riot only that thc I./3Cs have a n~uch wicle~, 
choicc. hut also tR:~l Ihe tcchnolo~y rllarkcl shows some sign.; oi' hcchotiiing 
co~npc~i l i vc .  This ol'l'crs, as has hocr~ alAgucd by Bh:~rclliiun unrl Singh 
( 1987). a possihi l i ly  Ibr rhc ~crhnolofy huycrs ro iurn IC tahlc in ~ h c i r  
1 .  . "  
,I\OI 11 pnjpcr str,:~~c~ics arc uscd. Thc role 01' markel sh;lrc is fountl lo 
hc dil' lc~~crrt in  the choicc o f c t ~ t ~ n t ~ y .  While i t  i~ Ibund no1 sigrlil'icatil in 
il ic cht~icc of Jttpi111 :illd thc US i~ cxcrlcd n ~ ~ o s i l i v e  ;~nd s ign i f  can1 
inllucnce in  the collnholarions with UK a n t i  ncgalivc aild signiI'ic;int 
i r ~ l ' l u ~ n c c  in cullabora~ioiis with Crelm;uy as co~upa~-cd to l l ic  othcr 
cotrnlt-ies. Tlic prtii'l'cncc o f  111e lil-nls wi lh rllonopoly pc~wel to go Tor 
i'orcign cv1lnhor;uion wi l l \  U K  cnulcl he ill lrihu[ctl lo Iiis~r)~-ic';~I I actot.s. I t  
is il l~crcstitig lo norc rhar ll ic \)oiilivc: 1.o1c orsi/.e iunti p r o i i ~   hot wc Iiil\:c 
obsd'vctl in 1l3c PI-nhii nlodcl do not holrl i n  lhc case of  tiunc o1'1l i~ 11i;$o1- 
col lihhorating ps-tncts c ~ ~ ~ 1 3 t  tlic 01I1cr C~IIIII~~L'S. Si111ilu1-Iy. t llc I'orcign 
c t l ~ i ~ l n !  is lound to hc ncgatfvc in tIlc citsc oT(icl.~i~any tvhcrc as, it is nut 
signil'icitnl in lhc cilsc oI' USA, IJK 01. .lapun, irr~plying thal i~ is  posilive 
i11it1 siynil ' ic;~n~ in O L ~ C I *  countr~cs. The w l e  ol'lrnde ir also Ibuntl lo dii'l'el- 
wil h r c s p c ~  In the mi~jor ~echnology exporting counlrics. WhiIc exporrs 
arc positive and i~nlw~rrs are ncpative in the ca.w of USA and UK neilhcr 
exports nor imports :ire fbund l o  have any influence i n  the firms' decision 
to collabulmatc with Japan or Germany. 
Estilnatcs ol' the tnultinolnial logit model on thc tcfms of 
collaboration as ~cvcaletl i.0111 [he dilfcrcnt combini~tions ol' royalty and 
lu~npsurn is pl-escntcd in Tahlc4. Tbc cslinuled pmhahiIity Ibr dilfercnl 
tcrmv of utlllnb{wnt ion i s  11s frdlows: p~uhahility o f  having only lu~npsunl 
i s  fourld to hc ~ h c  highcst: (78.58) hllowctl by b l th  n~yalty nntl lumpsum 
( IJ.Oh3, no ~ ~ o p l l y  and no lumpsum (4.25) and oiily royatly (3.10). Thc 
prel'crcncc a~rlcr o l  a typical profit m;lxirni/.ing I'inn aperat ing in n 
crbmpc[i~ivc ~narkc~.  cvcrything else rcrnnining thc sanlc. i~ could hc 
argucd, would hc Ihc Ibllowing: thc highcst prefcrcncc would Iw for a 
dcal involving neither myally nor lumpsum followcd by only lumpsum, 
only royalty, anrt Tinnlly for ihosc wi(h lumpsunl imtl myillty. Vicwcd 
thus. thc ahscrvcd highcst probahiliry for the cafes with only lumpsum 
lcrtd to indicate tltat thc Indiiln t lr~rls havc bucn :thlc to ahrain technology 
ar hvorahle Icrms. I-lowcver, given the I h c ~  that most of  lie f r i ~ i s  opcralc 
in conccnlmtcd markel. l l ~ e  rcvcnlcd prcf'crcncc ot' t hc lnrpc Indian I?rms 
would h:~ve heen Ji Tl'crcnt Tram llle compc~itivc linns. Thic i s  evidenr 
when we picuc Io~crher the prohahiljty OF thc choicc nf count ry and the 
prnhabililics of d i f r c ~ ~ . n ~  tcrms across dil'f'ertmt coulttrrcs. I1 is cvidcnt 
from table 5 hat the 111oct ~>rcl'cr;rhlc tern1 (Sol .  a Tirm ope~nting in Ihc 
con~pe~itive marker) rs ciTfcl-ed by UK wherc the pn~huhi i i~y  ol' neither 
lun~psunl nor ruyi~liy. or only Itrmpstun payment is  [tic I~iyhcsr and thnr 
of  hoth royalty ant1 lurnpsurn i s  thc lowca. But. as wc have ali-ci~dy 
~iatcd, in tertils aT the rcvcalcd plrhcncc.  111e highcsr pmbi~bil ty is  to 
c~llnbori~~c wid1 orha.counrrics, where the prohahilily ofi1 uollahornt~on 
involv ins  hoth royally a ~ d  lumpsum i s  Ihc highcsl. 
From thc technology sellca' point ol* view a tlral involving hoth 
royidi? iod lumpsum is  most prcFcrred because i t  enables them to spread 
the risk. By setting such a lcrln rhc Virm is  hettcr in\ulatud apaitlsr ordinary 
corn~iicrcial and the so called polir ical 1 isk (Contractor 1085 p.5). From 
thc huycrs' side, a ileal involving both royally and lunipsum cnsurcs 
con! inucd support 01- ~ h c  sellcr, if nccdtul, so [ ! l i l t  tllc r i ~ k  is ~ i l i n ~ i l i i ~ c d .  
?'his will particularly bc the caw iI' thc buyers' lechrioiogicul cajwhilily 
is  mtlicr poor and ~ lccd  thc ca~~ r i ~ i ucd  supporl 01' [he sellcr. T l ~ o u $ ~  ~t 
wcluld raisc the cost ol'production. given thc hip11 market powcr: ii~crei!scd 
cost could easily hc tri~nsrevrcd 10 Ihe con\tlmc~-s Vicwtd thus thc 
uhsesvcd prctcrencc could bc ,In indicalion ot'the risk aversion behavior 
c ~ f  Iikrgc Indim I'inns wiih low tecliiiolopical caprthili~y :it~il high market 
power. 
I t  i s  iilvl intcrcsling to no~c  t l ~ i i ~  the suhsitliarics of thc t'orcign 
ca~~ipanies hakc il lliitch higbcr prohnhility ul' ohtitirting ~cchnology a~ 
the n~ost I:ivorahle \crhm viz. wit17 i iei~her oy:illy norluinpsurn (SX.433,) 
with thu rcspcclivc pnthahility oI' orlly lumpsum. only royalty end holh 
royally anti lumpsum I~cing 24.48(%. ?.(:I YL and 15.OX pa ccr~t, This is a 
pl;ulsihlc explanation l i w  the strung posiii\.e ;usociation hc\wtcn to t ' c i~n  
control and tcchnulogy licensing. Howeirer, o I'irm conclusion is nnl 
war~.untctl in ~ h c  ;ihscncc of  any ir~l'orn~ation on other ~I-~~IISIC~S 1n:lrlu hy 
the suhsidiarics to \lit Il;ilrnl l i r~n .  
'I'i~hlc 6 prcscllls ttic Hccklnan two st; l~c sc!ccliaii con.curcd 
c l~ in~a lcs  l i l r  Iur~ipsiiri~ and royally cqt~alic~n. TI1t sclcction cocllicicnt 
(l;rmhrl;~) is found s i g~~ i i i cn l~ !  Ibr both ul' Zhc ctli~afions csiimafing 
ILIIII~\LIIII 111d 1.0~illty ~ . i l t C .  T11ci~cS01.t'. i n  analy[ing tllc L ~ ~ l ( ~ ~ , ~  that 
rlc.!cr~ninc lie Icvcls 01' l u~npsur~~  i r ~ d  1-{)ya114; rate wc focus (MI the two- 
s ~ c p  ~s l i r i ~ i ~ l c r ;  ri~lllci. than ~ h c  0 l .S  cs~i111;11es. 11 n l ; q  nl \o  hc 11olcJ Illat 
Iwth of thc variahlcs ~ ~ s c t l  r ) idcnri l l  s;~mldc sclru~ion corrcurioii. ill  he 
PI-obit cc[i~;~t ions ur-e Ibund hralistici~lly s ig~~if icar~t in all rhe c r t i r~~a l td  
cclu;~tioti\. In hot11 lu r i~ l~s t~ ln  ku~t l  II)Y~IIIY C~U;~~~OI IS .  !tic sclcctiorl ~o r r t ~ t L ' d  
e s ~ i ~ ~ ~ i ~ t c s  :IIV [(ILIIILI lowci, LI;II IIIC c ~ l i i i ~ i ~ ~ t s  O I -  ; i l~i~osl :i l ~IIC 
indcpc~~dct l~  \:it ,iahla. 
The selection con-ected estimates of lurnpsum and royalty have 
some intcresrin? results to oFl'cr. Givcn the fact ihat ho~h are choice 
variables. in thc sense thal lower royalty rates are often counter-balanced 
hy highcr lumpsum (Alam l985), Ict us condcr  thc rcsults ol' holh 
equations together. To hcgin w i ~ h .  the cocfl'icien~ at' ibreign control i s  
posirlve and signif'icnnl in thc royalty ctluation. whcrcus the sign or thc 
coefiicieni i s  negative in ihc lun~psunl equation. That is. wilh equity 
participnrion thc uollahor~~ol-could f ix ;I highcr royal ty rak to conlpensatc 
properly for rhc technology and possibility of sh~rking is minimized. 
This explains ~ h c  nept ivc  cocft'icicnt of' lump sun^. Similar tinding was 
madc by Suhrnhn~nninn ( 1486) by analy7ing rlle industry level data on 
fbeign collahoralians published hy rht: Rehcl-vc Bank of  Indill. Thc 
aliloulil of lumpsurn is li)und to h~ positively associated with rhc marker 
sh;~rc, whcrc 3s LIIC h i p  of  he coct'i'icicnl i 3  ncen(ivc (not stutislically 
r;ignificitnt) in illc royairy cqtui~ion. Thc ctw t'liuicnt ol'cxpons is positivc 
and import5 i s  ne~at ivc  in t llc royalty cqu;r~icln. whcicas hor 11 uxports 
ant1 irilporlc are positive in t l ~ c  Ilrr~,!lsr~rn equation. TI-lal is, the 1i1.m~ 
with Ii~rgcr exports ;Ire ~XPCCIL'LI 10 Pity high royitl ty ; i r~cI  luri~psunt, \vhcrc 
;is. tllc royalty r;ilcs could hc Iuwcr i f  thc firm h;ls high imporls':. I t  i s  
~IIICI-L'S~~IIF 10 1101~' [hilt I ' I ~ I I ~ S  with higher proli ts uoulrl oht ain lccht io lo~y 
a1 n lower wyally.rA film conclusion is  no1 \ ~ r ; l l ~ i t ~ ~ t e d  in abscnce of an 
an:hy~is nf c;!u.;alilj-'). Similarly whilc rhc sizc has ;I n c p t i v c  ei'l'ecl on 
lutiipsurrl i~ is nor significant in dclerlnining iuyally rutc. Rcganling thc 
inlet--'ountry v i ~ r i n r i o n .  wh ik  11icrc is hardly any tlill'crcnce across 
cvu~ltrics rcg;~~,rling ~ i~n ipsu r r~ ,  col lnhc~rntio~~s with USA arwl Ccrinany 
has a pusitive cl'lecl on royalty. f;in;~lly IRC cocl~licicnts oI'thc i l idusry 
clr~lilrny tctltl 10 s iqgcs~  ccr~ain iotcr-industry vari;ition. In clcutronics 
and cny i~ j cc i~ng  thc ohwrvui [relid is  s i i i~~ lar .  pcxitivc ~n l u n ~ p s u m  hul 
n c y r i v e  in royitlty u'hcrc us stecl nrld miwcllaacous indusll-ics. thc 
coct't'iuieru \+as found ncga~ivc in  l u t ~ ~ l ~ s u n i  co~npa~-ccl l o  the ~ e x ~ i l c  
induht~y. 
Kffect oPrl'echnology Licensing on Profit and Net Exports 
Resul~s or' thc  estinia~cd p~-ol'ils and ncl  cxpurrs cq~~a l i ons  rbr 
c ( , I l i ~ h ~ ~ t o ~ ~  and nun collahol-:i(o~-s is  l~rcsenrcrl io ~ahle.7I.'. To hcgir~ 
wiih,  thc predicted mcan ~,rol ' i~ o f ~ h e  coll;thu~-ating firms (4.88) i~ f o u n d  
to hc highcr r l i i ~ r l  tl-la1 ol 'non colIahontling firnls (3.33). 011 lhe othcr 
Ii:md, ~ h c  prcdictcd IIIC~LII net exporl C;II-I~~ ng of ihc col1;lhornting fj  rms (- 
O.9h) dl-c i'ounrl ro hc Iowcr than rllc non collrih>l-;~ting firnls (-0.1 X)I4. 
0 1 1  [he wholc, [ l ~ c  Sfcct oS fbl-cign te~hnology l i c c~~s ing  on thc doii~cstic 
I'irms PI.CSCIIIS ;i I~IXC'I II~CLLII-e, wlli lc i t  CII~LIIICCS I ~ C :  ril-111s' pl'ofilahili~y, 
i l  is found  l o  hc t~i lv ing a d:~rnpcn i~~p cl'fcct 011 ncl cxpo1-l e i l r~~ing.  Thc 
I i~ l l c r  :lspcc~ i rldccd hits to hc sccr~ in~rrulin in ~ h c  ovcl-nl l context of il 
t~-;ltlc policy 1-cgin~c in which Ill-nls' prcl'crrccl prolcclcd local 1na1-kc1 to 
I l ~ c  olnpcl iri vc cx1~o1.I ~~~;u-kets. 
Anolhcr in icresi i~~y 1rsr111 I-clu~cs to Ihc scalc ei'lkct i n  111c nct cxporl 
c ~ r ~ r i n y .  l'c lirld i t11 invur*sc I-cla~ionship bclwccn size 2nd cxporls l i l r  
holh coIIabol-ating ;inti ~~or~-uol lahor i~ l ing I'il-ms. This finding is sirllilxi- 
[o  I he rcsulth of carlicr stutfics Ilia( IRc lorgcr I'il-111s tcnd to havc a snlallcr 
prol~cnsiry 10 export (Lnll iinrl K u m i u  198 I, L L I I ~  Sidk~ar-illan 1986). This 
i 5  to t ~ c  L ' A ~ c I c ~ I  in  an ccr;llomy with Iiupc durncstic III~I-ket cli;~i*;lc~e~-ired 
hy ;\ co~~ocn i r i~ tcd  rnarkci sll.ucturc or1 ~ l i c  onc hat111 iunrl I-tigllcr lcvcls ul' 
~ I . ~ I L ' c ~ ~ ~ I I  f'l.0111i ~ i t ~ r ~ ~ ; l l i l ) ~ l i \ l  ~01111)c~ilion 011 1111: otlicr-. Tl~c cfkcr  or' 
li)rraign conlrol on exporls slil l c u t ~ t i ~ ~ u c s  lo he a p o i n ~  01' cnulro\,crsy in  
1l1c clcvclop~ncnl eco~ lo~ t~ i cs  l lc~aturcl'. Our rcsulls show th;ll 11c1 cxporl 
carriinys al-c 11igl1~1. i n  thosc f'o~~cign co~~ t~ .o l l cd  I'irms wilh Icuh~~olugy 
licensing apscclucnls. Thu sign of I hc ~cwfi'icicnl i ~ r  thc rlon crh [ i lhoral in~ 
I 'o~,ci:_.~l subsiJi;~~,ics is ncgiitivc bur nor st;~tisrically significilnl. T'rtrnil~g 
l o  t l ~ c  inler-~inclucl~-y V~II-i:ilion in  nct cxl lo~' t  earning. corl~pitrcrl o t l ~ c  
~ c s t  ilcs ~.cfkr,cnc~c Fmup. all I bc indust~~ioc wirh fur'cign collahor.i~tion have 
I? 1Vr h;we nluu 111:lric 01 S C + ~ ~ I I ~ L I ~ C \  11U fi>I:11 ~ ' ~ p o r t l r  31id c ' x ~ ? ~ I I , ~  i ~ c l i h i [ y  ( C Y P D I ~  :IS II 
I) I - I )PU~~~UII  OI'$;IIC\) :inti Ilic ~'ccult!: wci-c I ht: <:irlle lllc 11cl cxpull colllinps r.q11;11ii)ri. 
Ilcncc nor p~.usc!ltcd hclc 
1 J I-IC~I 111 hull1 u:I\c'\ II:IVC >hrv,rn rhal l l ~ a  tl!lf'r:r-cucc ilr cignil'icnnt at 1 lwt t:rrll level 
13 Scc Jcnkii~\ (1090) fiw a r,cccnt survcy 
a positive cffcct on net export. However, it  [iced to he ~ l o t c d  [hat rcxliles 
have a very high negalivc cocfl icicn~. Only thc miscellancou$ industries 
in thc collahornling group has a positive ciTecr on export earning whcrc 
ns clcotrooics has a ncgalive impact. In [he non collahora~ing roup also, 
~ h c  nnly industry whcrc rhcrc i s  a posirivc nct e x p r t  earning i s  Kood, 
whilc c hcmicals, clcc(ronics and cnginccring I I ~ V C  :i 11c~;ltivc elfect on 
the net exporl carning. To bc moro prccise, f i rms in ~ h c  f w d  prwcssing 
industry, whcthcr crllliihoraiing or nun-collaborating. have a positive 
cfftct and Iil-rr~s in electronics. both c o l l a h o ~ ~ ; ~ ~ i n ~  ;~nd on-collaI>r)t.a~in~. 
have a ncgilrivc dr'ccr on ncl oxpr~~-zs'~. 
Rcst~lrs or thc profit funcric~n lilrcollilbora~o~:., and non collahomtors 
have shown thar, whi tc mnrkcr s h a ~ r  plays a positivc and sign1 ricanr 
role in ~ h l :  cxc of cullahorarors, thc coeffrurent is posiiivc hut do nor 
hirvc rhc rcquircd levcl of statistical significance in the case of non 
collahralors. This lintliag i s  broadly in ~ u n c  w ir h indust! in1 m.gnniz;nion 
thcory which prcdiuls a posi~ivc a s s t ~ i a ~ i o n  hc~wecn markct slructurr: 
and i)rof'ir;ihil~~y. Sccundly, cxports arc hund to havc positivc el'fcct on 
profit only i n  khc caw uf  tlon-collahorn~o~-';. S~mi lw ly ,  lhc posilivc 
asswi;~tiorl hctwccn l'oreign conti.ol ant1 ~>rof i l id~i l i fy  is  round only in 
thc case c ~ t '  non collahuntors. Tun~ing to thc inter-i~~dustry diffcsenccs. 
corupnred lo thc tcxtilcs ~cfcrcncc group. al l  t hc otl~cr inclualrics llavc 
ncptivc sign in thc case of ct~l lahorat~rs.  ;tnd posilive i n  thc case of 
non-coilahorara(ors cxoept clccrronics and srcel. Sincc the textile ccw:FI'~cicrlt 
if pucitive and sigailicant in both caws, thc ect iroatcd absolute cod'ticicnts 
has shown the fol iowing I n  thc c;isc of chumiual and I'ood both 
collahorators and non collahorators havc poslti\.c profils In  the case of 
s~cc l  mllaboraiors have pos i~ ivc  prol'i~ and non collahor;tlo~.s hnvc 
negative pro tit. In !he case ot'elccrronius. cn~inccring and 1ni5ceI l;mcous 
indu.;trics only lion colliihorators hrivc ~ ~ o s i t i v c  p~-o l i  t . On the wllolc, thc 
collabora~ors l~avc Ili$ci p~cli'if than Ihc non coil:iboralors. 
I h Thc liipll iritpurl i~~lcnsily- of c l t v t r o ~ ~ i z ~  intlum !. tr11~1v1 lilre~:~lii.;irio~~ kc11 ~butctl 
hy Jt\sc-ph ( 1002) 
Concluding Observations 
In  thc light o f  the findings hy the recent rcscarch rhnt thcre apvurs 
to hc rcnl opl>orkuni~icsfnr LDCs lo obtain high yieldq from teuhnolo~y 
liccnsing ngrcc~cmcnzs, wc have lookcd into soine ofthe hsic hut imprlnnl  
and oflcn ncglcctcd issucs on rbrcign tcchnology liccnsing in Indian 
industry. They inclutlotl; a) wliat i s  the probvhili~y that a firm I-esorts to 
Ibreign coll:~kura~ion and what are ~hc:  fa'ncrars that in tl trcncc thc dccisim 
10 collnhoratc. h) what i s  thc prnbi~hility of choosing rhci~ partners from 
a pnrricular country and wlint arc lhc Ihctors and lilrces inilucncing the 
ohhcrvcd choice. u) what i q  ~ h t  pruhahility nf obtaining ~echnoIogy on 
cenain tcrnls and ct)ndilir,ns and what arc tlic factors [hat govern the 
ohl;erved zcrnis of licensing, d) rhc drrcrn~innnts of rhc lcvcls of royatrp 
raw and lumpsuni payment to hc r~ladc Tor thc lcct~nolo~y ~r;utsfcn.L.<i 
and cl thc cl'fccl of  lilrcign ~oll~tholmticln 011 recipicril firms' performilnce 
in icrnls (IT pml'it and llcr cxporl cilrning. 
Thc csfirnatcs of thc pmhir modcE show that thc cxugcnouq factors 
likc the stock orwicnlilic and technical knowlcdgc a h a d  hns a pnsilivc 
influence on the til-rns' decisinn to liccnse forcip tcchnology, suggehring 
tlic cxislence ol's~rcing tccl~ncllopical spi Ilovcrs. Thu fin11 spccilic r;lclcws 
likc the size, imports. pl-ch'it and Ihrcign control arc Ihund lo hc inrlucing 
litms ro deveiop Voreign collahora~ions. On ~ h c  other t~and, thc market 
ctriicel-~ t l n t  k n  lend lo 11;lul: a negarivc elTccr suggcstinc th;~t rhe Intlian 
lil4ms considel- lilrcign collaborations as ;i means of incl*casing lheir 
compe~i~ivc stlatcgy. Tlit ohoicc ol' :I partner is inflitcnccd ~u~si l ivc ly  h  
111c stock (rf paterlls in l l i ; i~ coi1nt1.y and 11cg3tivcIy hq ( l i t  ctlmpcting 
cot~a~rics' patcnts sagcstin_r ilii~k tEic s t w k  ot  knowlcdpe 111 olie country 
is ;r suhs~ i ru~s ro !tiwe avai lnhlc in orhzr c.c>unlrics. This awnns nor onIy 
[hat Ihe L.UCs 1i;rvr: a much wider chc>icc. hut also 111;1i rhc Icchnolopy 
rnarkct shows so~nc signs o f  becoming compctilivc. This ul'f'ers it 
po\sihi!i~y Ibr thc tcchnolo~y i~r~pc~rtcrs o turn rhc lahlc in tllcir f;ival. i T  
prrq-icl- szr;l~egic~ arc ;~ilop~ctl. Eslimalcs of ~ h c  Mulliaoritial logr~ motlcl 
on rhc tcrilis of t c chno l t ~~y  liccnsing h;wc sha\vn lhal the htghcsz 
p ~ ~ h h i l i r y  is 10 hnvc u tcul~ntilogy dcal will1 only lu~iipsuiii ndicating 
Ihe terms in which firms obtain lechnology. This could he a combined 
cffect of the gnod bargaining power of' thc Indian lirms and the increasing 
co~npetition i n  the inlernational technoIogy markcl. Our selecrion 
correcrcd csliniatrs of royalty rates and lunlpsunl show ihat while Ihc 
foreign co~~trol and expons have a p s i  tive cffcct on royally ralc, prolil 
is round to havc a negative cffect. Similarly whilc the markct sharc, 
exports and imports have a positive effcccr on l u m p w ~ m ,  foreign control 
and size is found to have a ncgative effcct. Thc finding that the firms 
with largct cxports are expected to pay high royalty and lumpsum tend 
to suggest that t l~c  foreign collaborations are yct to become cxp01.t 
friendly. Evidently, the roreign films are also interested in taking 
advantage of  he protected domesric markel. Our analysis of thc eftkcl 
of  forcig~l rechnology licensing using [Re estirnucs of thc profir and 
export functions has produced ;1 mixed rcsutts. While technology 
licensing is found to enhance Firrtls' pi-ofitahility. i t  i s  found having a 
negative cffecl on the nct export earnings. 
Tablc. I 
Summary of Variables Uscd in the Anal 
Variable I Unirs I Mcnn I Sld, Ucv, 
S~zc (Ciroa Fix. Ink) 
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Country-wise Distribution or Licensing agrcen~cnts by the Sarnple 
firms and Total agrcernents made by 
all the firms in India. 
Table. 3 
Probit estimate on the factors influencing the decision to cnllaborate and 
the hlullinornial logit estimate on the choice of countries 
Prohi1 hl&l hlullino~i~ial Losir I ~ I P I  
Collah~nrstc wilh 
Vaiablcs mtlmmc willr 
any coui~i i .~ USA En_cland Cicrnlat~y 

Significant ak leas1 at 10 per ucnt level 
Estimated probability of the different combiaation of royalty 
rate and lunrpsum across different countries 
Royalty and 1,ampsurn cqoations With Selectivity Correction 
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* Sisnit'icant at least al I0 per cent level 
* 
Variables 
Electronics dum~n y 
Engineering dummj. 
Steel&basic dummy 
Food processing durnlny 
Othcrs dummy 
Sclcctivity term (1,a1n hda) 
Number of observations 



































OI,S Eslimatrs of I'rufit ar~d Net Export E'quatiot~s for 
Collaborators ant1 Noa-collaborators 
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